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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Drawing on a compilation of data from household 
surveys representing 130 countries, many over a period 
of 25 years, this paper reviews the evidence on levels and 
recent trends in global poverty and income inequality. 
It documents the negative correlations between both 
poverty and inequality indices, on the one hand, and 
mean income per capita on the other. It points to the 
dominant role of Asia in accounting for the bulk of the 
world’s poverty reduction since 1981. The evolution of 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to is part of a larger effort in the department to document the levels and changes in global poverty and inequality. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at 
fferreira@worldbank.org and mravallion@worldbank.org. 
global inequality in the last decades is also described, 
with special emphasis on the different trends of 
inequality within and between countries. The statistical 
relationships between growth, inequality and poverty are 
discussed, as is the correlation between inequality and 
the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Some of the 
recent literature on the drivers of distributional change in 
developing countries is also reviewed
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This paper summarizes the recent evidence on global poverty and inequality, including 
both developed and developing countries. It draws on two main compilations of distributional 
data created at the World Bank, both of which are built up from country-specific nationally 
representative household surveys, generally fielded by national statistical offices.  First is the 
PovcalNet data set, which comprises some 560 surveys for 100 low and middle-income 
countries, representing some 93% of the developing world’s population.2 Where necessary, the 
PovcalNet data set is complemented with information from the World Development Report 2006 
household survey database, which has a somewhat broader geographical coverage (including 
many developed countries), but a more limited time-span. 
In the first part of the paper we discuss our poverty and inequality data and present 
evidence on levels and recent trends in poverty and inequality around the world. Global and 
regional poverty aggregates are also discussed here. Section 2 turns to the issues involved in 
aggregating inequality indices across countries, in order to construct a meaningful measure of 
global inequality. It reviews the main results from the literature that has sought to measure global 
income inequality, and briefly summarizes some of the evidence on global inequalities in health 
and education. Section 3 discusses the empirical relationship between economic growth, poverty 
and inequality dynamics. Here we present what we see as the three key stylized facts to emerge 
from these data: the absence of a correlation between growth rates and changes in inequality 
among developing countries; the strong (positive) correlation between growth rates and rates of 
poverty reduction, and the importance of inequality to that relationship. In Section 4, in a more 
speculative mode, we turn to the likely economic determinants of poverty and inequality 
changes. Section 5 offers some conclusions, and points to some promising research themes 
within this general topic. 
 
1. Poverty and inequality around the world: A bird’s eye view 
 There has been a remarkable expansion in the availability of household surveys in 
developing countries over the last 25 years. These surveys, which are typically designed and 
fielded by national statistical agencies, have the measurement of living standards in the 
population as one of their key objectives. Although clearly there are measurement errors in such 
                                                 
2 See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp . 
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data, it is also widely accepted that these data represent the best available source of information 
on the distribution of living standards for any country where they have been conducted. 
 Our poverty and inequality measures are constructed for the distributions of household 
income or consumption per capita, as captured by these surveys. This choice of indicator 
prompts three caveats. First, by focusing on income or consumption, we end up effectively 
taking a one-dimensional approach to measuring welfare. It would clearly be desirable to include 
other important dimensions of welfare not already included in consumption or income (at least 
directly), such as health status, cognitive functioning, civil and personal freedoms and 
environmental quality.3 Even short of a fully multidimensional approach to welfare, it might well 
be desirable to include in the aggregate indicator of well-being some measure of the value of 
access to public and publicly provided goods (such as education and health services, personal 
security, and access to local infrastructure). But extending welfare measurement in either of 
these two directions in a manner that allows international comparisons is impossible on the basis 
of the information available to date. We therefore restrict our attention to the narrow realm of 
people’s ability to consume private goods, as measured by their income or consumption 
expenditures.  
 Second, income is not the same thing as consumption. Although over the long-run 
consumption should come quite close to permanent income (except for the limited number of 
lineages where bequests are important), there can be considerable deviations in the short run, as 
households either save or dissave. Consumption is thus generally considered a better measure of 
current welfare than income.4 In addition, and perhaps of greater practical importance, the 
questionnaires for income and consumption are perforce quite different, and yield different types 
of measurement error; see Deaton (1997). As a result of both higher measurement error and of 
the variance of the transitory component5, income inequality tends to be higher than inequality in 
consumption expenditures in a given distribution. In the description that follows, we use 
                                                 
3 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a well-known example of how one can construct an aggregate index that 
combines income and certain “non-income” dimensions of welfare. The HDI does not directly reflect inequality 
within countries and also imposes some questionable aggregation conditions (including trade offs); for further 
discussion see Ravallion (1997). Grimm et al. (2006) provide an ambitious attempt to differentiate the HDI by 
income groups. 
4 It is sometimes claimed that this argument carries less weight in developed countries, but for a counter argument 
see Slesnick (1998).   
5 There tend to be more people dissaving than saving at the bottom of the distribution, and more people saving than 
dissaving at the top. 
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consumption distributions to construct our poverty and inequality measures wherever possible. 
Only when consumption data are unavailable in the survey do we report income-based 
indicators. The type of indicator is noted for each country in Table 1. 
 Third, by looking at the distribution of income or consumption per capita, we are 
effectively making two strong assumptions, neither of which is likely to hold perfectly. First, we 
ignore intra-household inequality. Following common practice, such inequality is simply 
assumed away from our computations. Secondly, even if one is forced to use a single indicator 
for each household, it is not clear that the per capita definition is the most appropriate. There are 
differences in needs across age groups (and possibly genders), and there may well be certain 
fixed costs or “household public goods” that generate economies of scale in consumption at the 
household level.6 Both of these considerations have led many analysts to use some measure of 
“equivalent income” as their welfare indicator for each household. However, these variables turn 
out to be quite sensitive to the different assumptions made in identifying specific equivalence 
scales from observed demand behavior, and there is no agreement on which particular scale 
should be used.7 There is likely to be more agreement, in fact, with the statement that different 
scales may be appropriate for different settings (such as, say, South Korea and Togo). All this 
implies that seeking to introduce sensitivity to household size and composition in the context of 
international comparisons is, given the present state of knowledge, likely to contribute to less, 
not more, clarity. 
 Having agreed on the choice of welfare indicator, the next challenge is the aggregation of 
the national distributions into scalar poverty or inequality indices. This is a much easier problem 
in the case of relative inequality measures that are, by construction, scale-invariant.8 Since these 
measures do not depend on mean incomes or on the currency in which income is expressed, a 
number of vexing issues to do with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates and with the 
relevance of national account means to welfare measurement (to which we return below when 
discussing poverty measures) can be safely ignored. The inequality indices reported in Table 1 
are therefore simple Gini indices and mean log deviations (MLD), computed over the original 
distribution of household consumption (or income) per person in each country’s nominal 
                                                 
6 See Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995). 
7 See Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992). 
8 Absolute inequality measures, which may well be relevant for the discussion of global trends, are scale-sensitive. 
We return to absolute measures of inequality in Section 2 below. 
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currency, in each year.  Unlike the Gini index, MLD is additively decomposable into between-
group and within-group inequality components (Bourguignon, 1979). 
Absolute poverty measures, on the other hand, summarize the extent of deprivation in a 
distribution with respect to a specific welfare threshold, given by the poverty line. This implies 
that scale matters, and so does the choice of mean (e.g. mean income from a household survey, 
or GDP per capita) and exchange rate when making inter-country comparisons or aggregations. 
It has been argued that misreporting of incomes in household surveys would justify scaling up 
the income distribution so that its mean equaled per capita consumption in the Private 
Consumption account in the National Accounts System (NAS).9 But such an approach ignores 
the fact that the Private Consumption account includes components of institutional consumption 
as well as personal consumption, which could introduce a systematic overstatement of household 
welfare levels. Things are even worse if the scaling up is to GDP per capita itself, rather than 
only to per capita consumption from the NAS. 
In addition, in economies with substantial subsistence agriculture and other forms of 
production for own consumption, it is not clear that the national accounts system provides a more 
accurate portrayal of real consumption than the surveys, which typically include information on 
consumption from own production at the household level. Finally, it is unlikely that income 
under-reporting or selective compliance in surveys is distribution-neutral.10 If richer households 
under-report more than middle-income or poorer households, then the uniform re-scaling that is 
proposed would result in an unwarranted under-estimation of poverty. It appears likely that 
richer households are also less likely to participate in surveys. This has theoretically ambiguous 
implications for inequality, although there is evidence (for the US) that it entails a non-negligible 
underestimation of overall inequality (Korinek et al., 2006). In what follows we do not use 
National Accounts information to re-scale mean incomes or consumption from the surveys 
(although NAS data are used in the interpolation method of Chen and Ravallion, 2004, which is 
used for “lining up” household surveys with the reference years used in Tables 2 and 3). 
In this paper, we report poverty measures with respect to the World Bank’s “standard” 
international poverty line of about $1 a day (or, more precisely, $32.74 per month, at 1993 
                                                 
9 See, for instance, Sala-i-Martin (2006). 
10 See, for example, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) and Korinek et al. (2006).  
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international PPP exchange rates).11 This is a deliberately conservative definition of “poverty,” 
being anchored to the poverty lines typical of low-income countries. It is also one that has 
acquired considerable currency in international policy discussions: The first Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG1), for example, is to halve the 1990s “$1 a day” poverty rate by 2015. 
To gauge sensitivity, we also use a line set at twice this value, $65.48 per person per month.  
Following common practice we refer to these as the “$1 a day” and “$2 a day” lines ($1.08 and 
$2.15 would be more precise).  The higher line is more representative of what “poverty” means 
in middle-income developing countries.  
These international lines are converted to local currencies using the Bank’s 1993 PPP 
exchange rates for consumption, and each country’s consumer price index (CPI).  PPP exchange 
rates adjust for the fact that non-traded goods tend to be cheaper in poorer countries. There is 
more than one way to calculate PPP exchange rates. The Geary-Khamis (GK) method used by 
the Penn World Tables (PWT) uses quantity weights to compute the international price indices. 
For our purposes, this method gives too high a weight to consumption patterns in richer countries 
when measuring poverty globally. The Elteto-Kones-Sculc (EKS) method — a multilateral 
extension of the usual bilateral Fisher index — attempts to correct for this bias.  Since 2000, the 
World Bank’s global poverty and inequality measures have been based on the Bank’s PPP rates, 
which use the EKS method.12  At the time of writing, new PPP rates, based on 2005 prices, are 
about to become available. While existing poverty and inequality measures have not yet been 
revised accordingly, we comment later on some of the likely implications. 
 Once the international poverty lines have been appropriately converted into local 
currency, and local CPI has been used to inflate the line to the nominal currency of the survey 
year, poverty measures are calculated for each survey year.  Naturally, different countries do not 
all field their household surveys (which are rarely annual) in the same year. In Table 1, we report 
the year(s) in which the latest surveys available to us were conducted in each country, and report 
poverty measures for those years. In Tables 2 and 3, where we seek to describe regional and 
global poverty aggregates, the poverty measures are lined up in time for each of a set of 
“reference years” using the interpolation method described in Chen and Ravallion (2004).   
                                                 
11 See Chen and Ravallion (2001) for a detailed description of how this line was constructed. 
12 For further discussion of the difference between these two methods and the bearing on poverty measurement see 
Ackland et al. (2006). 
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We will focus on the most common poverty measure, namely the headcount index (H), 
which gives the proportion of the country’s population that live in households with per capita 
incomes below the poverty line. Other measures are the poverty gap index (PG), which gives the 
average shortfall of income from that line, where the average is taken over the entire population 
(with the gap set to zero for incomes higher than the poverty line); the squared poverty gap index 
(Foster et al., 1984); and the Watts (1968) index.  The latter two measures penalize inequality 
amongst the poor, and so are better at picking up differences in the severity of poverty.  
PovcalNet provides all these measures. In some of the discussion, we also multiply H by the 
country’s population, to yield the absolute number of poor people. 
 Table 1 presents the two inequality measures (Gini and MLD) and H for the two poverty 
lines for every country for which we have household-survey data.13 Wherever possible, we 
present results for two periods: (i) the 1990s (centered on 1994), and (ii) the 2000s (centered on 
2004). Since most surveys have less-than-annual frequency and since countries field their 
surveys on different schedules, for each country we use the survey nearest to the two period 
centers, and indicate the year in the table. 
 The range of inequality measures across the 130 countries in Table 1 is very large indeed. 
The Gini index ranges from 0.20 in the Slovak Republic, to 0.74 in Namibia. The MLD ranges 
from 0.12 in Hungary to 0.71 in Bolivia using data for the 2000s; using data for the 1990s, the 
range is from 0.07 in Slovak Republic to 1.13 in Namibia.  In terms of country groupings, the 
high-income economies (including the OECD) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 
record the lowest inequality measures, and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) have the highest. The predominance of measures using income, rather than 
consumption, in LAC is a contributing factor to the high inequality measures for that region. The 
high-level of inequality in SSA thus deserves special mention, as many of the indices refer to 
distributions of consumption expenditures. The commonly-held view that LAC is 
unambiguously the most unequal region in the world needs to be qualified accordingly.  
Figure 1 plots inequality (measured by the latest available Gini coefficient) against GDP 
per capita for each country listed in Table 1. The figure reveals a negative correlation between 
inequality and mean incomes (measured by GDP per capita). The correlation coefficient is –0.44  
(statistically significant at the 1% level). In addition, the variance of inequality is higher among 
                                                 
13 An extended version of Table 1 is available from the authors giving PG for both poverty lines. 
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poorer countries, but much smaller among richer ones. Above $20,000 per capita per annum, all 
Gini indices lie in the relatively narrow interval of (0.25, 0.45). The implication is that no 
country has successfully developed beyond middle-income status while retaining a very high 
level of inequality in income or consumption. High inequality (a Gini above 0.5, say) is a feature 
of underdevelopment. We do not explore the difficult issue of causality here: is it that high 
inequality prevents growth, or is it that growth tends to reduce inequality? These issues are the 
subject of large literature, which is summarized by Voitchovsky (2008). We simply note the 
significant negative correlation in levels, and that very high levels of inequality are not observed 
among rich countries in the present-day cross-section.  
In terms of changes over time, there is no universal or common trend in inequality 
between the 1990s and 2000s. Out of the 49 countries in Table 1 that have inequality measures 
for both periods, 30 (29) record an increase in the Gini (MLD14) index, 13 (16) record declines, 
and in 6 (3) countries there has been little or no change, which we (somewhat arbitrarily) define 
as being in the range (-2.5%, 2.5%). These numbers are consistent with a perception of rising 
within-country inequality, but we caution against over-interpreting results in a selected sample of 
some 50 countries for which data was available on both periods. 
 The situation is somewhat different with regard to poverty: there is even greater variation 
in levels, the correlation with mean incomes is more pronounced, and there is a clearer pattern in 
the recent changes. Two important facts can be gleaned from Figure 2, which plots H (for the $1-
a-day threshold) against GDP per capita. The first is that absolute poverty incidence decreases 
markedly with mean income, as one would expect. The simple correlation coefficient is -0.57 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Above a GNP per capita of approximately $15,000 
p.a., this extreme kind of absolute poverty essentially vanishes.15 In fact, dollar-a-day poverty is 
not even estimated for the high-income countries listed in Table 1, and they are not included in 
Figure 2. The second fact is that this relationship between mean income and poverty is not 
statistically “tight”. The points in Figure 2 do not lie neatly along a specific curve or line. Below 
a per capita GDP of around $12,000, there is considerable variation in the incidence of extreme 
poverty for each level of mean income.  In fact, at around $2,000, one can find countries with the 
                                                 
14 Forty-nice countries report Gini coefficients in both periods. Forty-eight report MLDs in both periods. 
15 Which may explain why researchers looking at developed countries tend to be more concerned with inequality 
than with poverty and, even when addressing the latter, usually rely on alternative concepts of poverty, such as 
relative poverty, social exclusion.  
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same per capita income levels reporting poverty rates in a range from zero to 65%. Latent 
country-level heterogeneity may well be confounding the ability to detect the true relationship; 
we will return to this point.  However, as we will see in the next section, this heterogeneity in 
poverty levels conditional on mean incomes has a lot to do with between-country differences in 
the level of inequality. 
To look at poverty trends over time, we resort to a longer time series than the one 
presented in Table 1. Chen and Ravallion (2007) compile poverty indicators for 560 surveys 
from 100 countries (essentially the same sample of countries used by PovcalNet). Since poverty 
incidence at the $1-a-day threshold is effectively zero in high-income economies (which account 
for the main differences between the PovcalNet dataset and that presented in Table 1) we restrict 
our attention to the Chen-Ravallion sample of countries.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the world and regional average poverty levels, both as incidence 
(H) and in absolute numbers of the poor for selected reference years spanning 1981-2004. Table 
2 uses the $1-a-day poverty line, while Table 3 uses the $2-a-day line. There is clear evidence of 
a decline in absolute poverty in the developing world over the last quarter century. The incidence 
of $1-a-day poverty, as a proportion of the developing world’s population, fell from 40% in 1981 
to 18% in 2004. By 2004, the developing world as a whole was only four percentage points short 
of attaining MDG1 (a poverty rate of 14.3% by 2015). The corresponding proportions for the 
total population of the world are 34% and 15%, assuming that nobody lives below $1 a day in 
the high-income countries. Although the rapid reduction of poverty in China (from 63% to 10%) 
accounts for much of this global decline, there has clearly been progress elsewhere too: global 
poverty incidence excluding China falls from 31% to 21% over 1981-2004.  
The rates of poverty reduction have been quite disparate in different countries. If one 
partitions the country sample into the broad regions defined by the World Bank, we see clear 
heterogeneity in poverty reduction across regions (Table 2). The most pronounced decline was 
registered in East Asia (from 58% to 9%). South Asia came second, with a fall from 50% to 
31%. At the other end of the spectrum, poverty incidence actually rose in ECA during the period 
of transition from socialism to market economies, though showing encouraging signs of progress 
since the late 1990s. In Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty was essentially the same in 2004 and 1981, 
having first grown during the 1980s, and then declined slowly since the late 1990s. Such a small 
decline in poverty rates, combined with a growing population, translates into a rise in the 
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absolute number of people living in households below the $1-a-day poverty line, as can be seen 
from panel (b) in Table 2. In fact, the number of poor people rose not only in Africa and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, but also in Latin America, where economic stagnation and persistent 
inequality in the last decades prevented substantial progress against poverty. These regional 
trends in poverty reduction are summarized in Figure 3 below, which is also taken from Chen 
and Ravallion (2007). The dominant role of poverty reduction in East Asia is immediately 
apparent.  
Trends are somewhat more muted for the $2-a-day poverty line. Global incidence in the 
developing world fell from 67% to 48% (59% to 52% if China is excluded). Poverty also fell 
markedly in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), and South Asia, but doubled in ECA. 
Because of population growth, the absolute number of poor people (under $2-a-day) rose in 
every region other than East Asia. Given a very substantial decline in East Asia, the world total 
grew only slightly, from 2.45 billion to 2.55 billion. This is in contrast to a decline in the 
absolute number of poor (under $1-a-day), from 1.47 billion to 0.97 billion in the same period. 
See tables 2 and 3.16 
The 1993 PPP exchange rates on which these calculations were based are known to have 
a number of problems.  In particular, the two most populous countries, China and India, did not 
participate in the 1993 price surveys, so their PPPs are subject to larger margins of error. This 
will be corrected in the 2005 PPPs, in which both countries participated.  The preliminary release 
of the new estimates at the time of writing indicate higher price levels in both China and India 
than implied by the 1993 PPPs, so the poverty rates in these two countries will rise relative to the 
rest of the developing world.  Aggregate poverty counts will then rise, although the rates of 
aggregate progress over time will actually be higher than implied by Tables 2 and 3, given that 
India and (especially) China had high rates of poverty reduction over time.  (Note that, while the 
new PPPs change the level comparisons, the real growth rates in a given country are unaffected.) 
 
2. Global inequality 
If constructing internationally comparable poverty measures is harder than computing 
comparable inequality measures (because the latter are scale-, and thus exchange-rate-invariant), 
aggregation into a single global measure is more difficult for inequality than for poverty. 
                                                 
16 For a more detailed discussion, including their recent estimates when accounting for cost-of-living differences 
between rural and urban areas, see Chen and Ravallion (2007). 
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Standard poverty measures are immediately decomposable by population subgroups and, 
therefore, easy to aggregate up from sub-groups. The numbers of poor can simply be added 
across countries, while poverty incidences and poverty gaps are first weighted by the country’s 
population share and then summed. This simple procedure underlies the global poverty incidence 
and the global absolute numbers of the poor that are reported in the previous section. 
The analogous procedure for inequality indices is more involved for two reasons. First, it 
has to contend with the fact that global inequality is not merely an aggregation of within-country 
inequalities. It also contains a component that corresponds to inequality between countries. 
Second, once the world is treated as a single entity, with a well-defined distribution of living 
standards, then the scale in which each individual national distribution is expressed matters 
again. While PPP exchange rate calculations are not needed if one simply wants to compare 
national levels of inequality, they are crucial for the construction of a global inequality index.  
By “global inequality” we shall mean inequality amongst all people of the world, 
ignoring where they live. This is calculated by combining the surveys from all the different 
countries (at the appropriate PPP exchange rates) into a single world distribution of income, and 
then computing inequality indices for this distribution. As long as the inequality index is 
additively decomposable (such as MLD), it will be possible to separate this overall measure into 
a component corresponding to inequality between countries, and one that aggregates the 
inequality within all the different countries. Only recently have household surveys been available 
for a sufficient number of countries for this approach to be feasible. Since then, this approach has 
become dominant among researchers interested in global interpersonal inequality—for the 
simple reason that it does not ignore inequality within countries.   
The earlier literature contains two (simpler) approaches to measuring overall inequality in 
the world. The first takes each country as the relevant unit of observation, and computes 
inequality between these “country means”. This is what Milanovic (2005) calls Concept 1 
inequality, and what World Bank (2005) calls inter-country inequality. Second, it is possible to 
take account of different population sizes by weighting each country mean by its share of world 
population—giving Milanovic’s Concept 2 inequality, or what World Bank (2005) calls 
international inequality. Both of these approaches are unsatisfactory since they ignore inequality 
within countries, and capture only the between-country differences.  
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In the last few years, a number of studies have sought to quantify global inequality, and 
to investigate its dynamics. One of the most ambitious was a paper by Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (2002), who constructed a time-series of world inequality estimates for the period 
from 1820 to 1992. For all but the last ten to twenty years of that series, disaggregated household 
survey data are not available for many countries. The authors thus grouped countries into 33 
‘blocks’, the composition of which changed over time, depending on data availability (see 
Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002, for details). The distributions are constructed in such a 
manner that all the members of a ‘bloc’ are assumed to have the same distribution as a country 
for which data are actually available in the relevant time-period. The authors construct a 
distribution based on decile (and some ventile) shares, and on GDP per capita figures. 
Individuals are assumed to have the same incomes within tenths (or twentieths) of the 
distribution, where that income corresponds to the group’s share of GDP per capita. This set of 
strong assumptions allowed the authors to construct a long time series covering most of the 19th 
and 20th centuries.17   
The main finding of the study is that world inequality rose almost continuously from the 
onset of the industrial revolution until the First World War. During that period, the world’s Gini 
index rose from 0.50 to 0.61.  Although inequality was also rising within most countries for 
which data were available, the real driving force for this increase in global disparity was 
inequality between countries, i.e., international inequality (see Figure 4). 
Between the two World Wars, and until around 1950, a decline in within-country 
inequality was observed, but the rise in inequality across countries continued apace and proved 
to be the dominant force.18 The world Gini index rose further to 0.64. From the middle of the 
twentieth century onwards, the rise of global inequality slowed, as Japan and parts of East Asia 
started growing faster than Europe and North America. This process became particularly 
pronounced after the take-off of China in the 1980s. Broadly speaking, global inequality changes 
in the second half of the last century are much less significant than in the 130 years that preceded 
                                                 
17 Given the long-run perspective of this exercise, however, it is likely that some of the problems associated with 
using means from the National Accounts had only limited importance. In particular, the estimated evolution of GDP 
per capita over such a long period is likely to be very strongly correlated with any measure of household welfare. 
18 The increase in inter-country inequality between 1914 and 1950 took place during each of the two World Wars, 
and most markedly during the Second World War. The inter-war period properly defined (1919-1939) actually saw a 
reduction in inter-country inequality. On the association between wars and rising international inequality, and 
between crises and its decline, both during this period and in 1890-1895, see Milanovic (2006). 
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it: there was certainly a reduction in the rate of growth of inequality and, towards the end of the 
period, it actually started to decline.   
When considering the last decades of the twentieth century, however, better and more 
comprehensive data are available, enabling researchers to work with approximations to the world 
income distribution based on (and only on) fully disaggregated household surveys. Looking at 
the second half of the century with these new data, three interesting regularities emerge. First, 
even as (unweighted) intercountry inequality continued to grow between 1950 and 2000, 
international inequality (when population weighted) began to fall. The disparate behavior in 
these two inequality concepts has been one of the reasons behind the discordant discourse on 
globalization and inequality. The continuing rise in intercountry inequality (to which Pritchett, 
1997, refers as “divergence, big time”) was due largely to slow growth in most poor (and small) 
countries, relative to some middle-income and richer countries. The decline in international 
inequality, which refers to a population-weighted distribution, was due fundamentally to rapid 
growth in two large nations that started out very poor: China and, to a lesser extent, India. As 
Figure 5 suggests, once China and India are excluded from the international distribution, the 
post-1980 trend in that inequality concept changes dramatically, and becomes much closer to the 
rising trend in intercountry inequality. 
The second regularity is that the last two decades in the twentieth century saw resumption 
in the upward trajectory of aggregate within-country inequality, defined as the contribution of 
within-country inequality to total inequality. The rise in within-country inequality prevented the 
decline in international inequality (which began, slowly, around the 1960s) from translating 
immediately into a decline in global inequality. Recall that global inequality is the sum of 
(appropriately aggregated) within-country inequality and international inequality. Indeed, 
Milanovic (2002, 2005) finds that global income inequality between people was still rising 
between 1988 and 1993, but appears to have fallen between 1993 and 1998. This is confirmed by 
World Bank (2005), which extends Milanovic’s data set by a couple of years. 
The third regularity is that there are signs of inequality convergence over time, whereby 
inequality has a tendency to rise in low inequality countries, and fall in high inequality ones. This 
was first noticed by Bénabou (1996), although his tests did not deal with the concern that the 
signs of convergence may stem solely from measurement error. Subsequent tests by Ravallion 
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(2003) indicate that convergence is still evident when one uses better data and an econometric 
method that allows for classical measurement errors in the inequality data.   
Bénabou interprets inequality convergence as an implication of a neoclassical growth 
model. Ravallion points instead to an explanation in terms of the policy and institutional 
convergence that has occurred in the world since about 1990.  Low-inequality socialist 
economies have become more market-oriented, which has increased inequality. On the other 
hand, non-socialist economies have adopted market-friendly reforms. In some of these 
economies pre-reform controls benefited the rich, keeping inequality high (Brazil is an example), 
while in others the controls had the opposite effect, keeping inequality low (India is an example).  
Thus liberalizing economic policy reforms can entail sizable redistribution between the poor and 
the rich, but in opposite directions in the two groups of countries.  However, as Ravallion also 
notes, the process of convergence toward medium inequality implied by his finding is not 
particularly rapid, and it should not be forgotten that there are deviations from these trends, both 
over time and across countries.    
The foregoing discussion has been about relative inequality. What about the competing 
concept of absolute inequality, which depends on the absolute gaps in levels of living between 
the “rich” and the “poor.”?19  As Figure 6 shows, the two concepts give rise to completely 
different trends for international inequality: whereas relative inequality measures (such as the 
Gini and the MLD) fall from around 1980 onwards, absolute measures record substantial 
increases.20 This figure is drawn for (population-weighted) international inequality, but the 
difference is as important when considering global inequality.  
Although this paper (and the broader debate) has focused on income inequality and 
poverty trends, there should be no presumption that it is the only inequality that matters. Indeed, 
from some perspectives, international disparities in health status and educational achievement 
may matter inherently just as much (in addition to being instrumentally important to shaping 
income inequality and poverty).  Since around 1930 there has been convergence in the 
intercountry and international distributions of life expectancy at birth (LEB). As (weighted) 
mean world LEB rose from 53.4 years in 1960 to 64.8 years in 2000, its distribution moved from 
                                                 
19 For further discussion of the role played by the concept of absolute inequality in debates about the distributional 
impacts of economic growth and trade openness see Ravallion (2004). 
20 Although we include only two relative and one absolute measure, the opposing trends between relative and 
absolute measures over this period are robust to the choice of index. See Atkinson and Brandolini (2004) 
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bimodality to unimodality and the coefficient of variation fell from 0.233 to 0.194 (World Bank, 
2005). This heartening trend was partly reversed, however, during the 1990s, when LEB fell 
precipitously in some of the world’s poorest countries, due largely to the spread of HIV/AIDS.21  
Educational inequality, measured for the distribution of years of schooling, has also fallen 
substantially over the last four decades or so. As mean years of schooling in the world rose from 
3.4 in 1960 to 6.3 in 2000, the coefficient of variation fell from 0.739 to 0.461.  (Note that 
inequality measures for variables like life expectancy or years of education have to be interpreted 
with care, as both variables are effectively bounded from above.) This pattern of rising means 
and falling inequality in attainment was common to all regions of the world and, in addition, all 
regions also saw a reduction in gender disparities, as measured by the male to female schooling 
ratio (World Bank, 2005).22 
Unfortunately, this reduction in attainment inequality has not always meant a reduction in 
the disparities in true educational achievement. Indeed, internationally comparable test score data 
suggests that these disparities remain strikingly large with, for example, the reading competence 
of the average Indonesian student in 2001 being equivalent to that of a student in the 7th 
percentile of the French distribution.  
These changes in the distribution of health and education should be taken into account 
when assessing global inequality in a broad sense. While this paper provides only a very brief 
summary of the existing evidence along each dimension, a number of scholars have attempted to 
explore the correlations among the different dimensions. Because increases in longevity have 
been greater in poorer countries, for instance, Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005) argue that 
inequality in measures of wellbeing that account for the quantity, as well as quality, of life have 
been declining throughout the post-war period.  
 
3. The growth-poverty-inequality triangle 
Given the negative correlation between mean incomes and inequality levels across 
countries that is illustrated in Figure 1, it is not surprising that there is an even stronger 
correlation between mean incomes and poverty rates. Given the mathematical relationship that 
must always hold between mean income, poverty and inequality, the first correlation more or less 
automatically implies the second. To see why, we can assume (without loss of generality) that 
                                                 
21 See Deaton (2003) on the relationship between health outcomes and inequality more broadly. 
22 See also Castello and Domenech (2002) on international inequality in education. 
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the shape of the Lorenz curve can be fully captured by a vector of (functional form) parameters 
π , such that ( )π,pL  is the share of consumption (or income) held by the poorest p proportion of 
the population, ranked by household consumption per person.  It is well known that the slope of 
the Lorenz curve ( )π,pL  with respect to p (denoted ( )π,pLp ) is simply the ratio of the quantile 
function (y(p)) to the mean μ .23  By evaluating that derivative at p=H, we can write the 
following equation for the headcount index of poverty, given a poverty line z: 
( )πμ ,1 zLH p−=          (1) 
(Where μπ /](.),[ 1 zLL pp =− .) 
  Equation (1) is an identity that relates the incidence of poverty at any given (real) poverty 
line to two aspects of the distribution: the mean μ and inequality or, more precisely, the Lorenz 
curve. From (1) it can be seen that the partial derivative of poverty with respect to the mean 
(holding the Lorenz curve parameters fixed) is always negative so that, if the poverty line is 
fixed and inequality is constant, poverty must fall as the mean rises.24 In the scatter-plot of 
Figure 2, the poverty line is the same across all countries. If Lorenz curves did not differ 
systematically with GDP per capita, poverty should be lower as GDP rises:. This association is 
only strengthened by the negative correlation between GDP and inequality levels in the cross 
section: higher income levels are associated with lower poverty both because of the direct effect 
of a higher mean at a given Lorenz curve, and because there exists an inverse empirical 
relationship between income levels and inequality.25 
  But the cross-country correlation between mean incomes and inequality need not be 
informative of the growth process of a particular country, since there may well be country-
specific idiosyncrasies that cloud temporal patterns in the cross-section. So, what happens to 
inequality as a particular country grows over time? The first careful attempt to answer that 
question, by Simon Kuznets (1955), has become so influential that it still guides a great deal of 
thinking on the topic. Building on the Lewis (1954) model of development as a transfer of 
resources from a low-productivity, low-inequality sector (say, traditional agriculture) to a higher-
                                                 
23 The quantile function is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function, p=F(y). 
24 This is a general result because the Lorenz curve is always (by construction) an increasing and convex function of 
the percentiles of the income distribution. 
25 It is interesting to note that the negative correlation between GDP and inequality levels is much weaker if the 
sample is restricted to developing countries only.   
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productivity, higher inequality sector (say, manufacturing or modern commercial agriculture), 
Kuznets hypothesized that inequality would rise during an initial phase of the process (as labor 
begins to move across sectors), and then eventually decline (as most workers are already in the 
modern sector, and the intersectoral gap loses significance). Kuznets found empirical support for 
this inverted-U inequality trajectory in the data he had available at the time, for the US, England 
and Germany.  Some cross-sectional studies have found evidence consistent with an inverted-U 
relationship between inequality and mean income, and there is a hint of this relationship in 
Figure 1.26 
 As data on changes in inequality over time have accumulated for many more countries, 
however, it has become apparent that the inverted-U relationship hypothesized by Kuznets does 
not hold in general. It does not hold systematically for individual countries for which there are 
long time-series of inequality measures. Bruno et al. (1998) compiled time series data on 
inequality measures amongst growing developing countries and found almost no cases that 
conformed to the prediction of the Kuznets Hypothesis. And its “dynamic version”, which 
postulates a relationship between rates of GDP growth and changes in inequality, does not seem 
to hold on average either. Using all countries in the PovcalNet data set for which there are more 
than one survey, Ravallion (2007) plots proportional changes in the income Gini against 
proportional changes in mean income for 290 observations, representing 80 countries. (This can 
be thought of as a re-estimation of the relationship in Figure 1 in which we restrict the sample to 
developing countries and allow for the existence of country-level fixed effects, potentially 
correlated with mean income.) A small negative correlation (r=-0.15) is found in the data, which 
is insignificant at the 10% level. Among growing economies, inequality tends to rise as often as 
it falls.27  Thus we have: 
Stylized Fact 1: Economic growth tends to be distribution-neutral on average in 
developing countries, in that inequality increases about as often as it decreases in 
growing economies. 
                                                 
26 Following the most common specification in the literature on testing the Kuznets Hypothesis, we regressed the 
Gini index on a quadratic function of log GDP per capita using the data in Figure 1.  The coefficient on log GDP 
was positive and that on its squared value was negative, and both coefficients were significant at the 1% level. The 
turning point was within the range of the data.   
27 Among economies experiencing contractions during the spells used by Ravallion (2007), inequality increases are 
somewhat more frequent than inequality reductions. 
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It is not then surprising that there is a strong correlation between growth rates and 
changes in absolute poverty.  This is evident in Figure 7, which plots the proportionate changes 
in the poverty rate (using the $1 a day line) against the growth rates in the survey mean; the 
correlation coefficient is -0.44 and the regression coefficient is -1.76 with a White standard error 
of 0.24; n=290 after trimming likely outliers due to measurement error.  Thus we have:28 
Stylized Fact 2: Measures of absolute poverty tend to fall with economic growth in 
developing countries. 
In discussing Figure 2 we had noted that, although there is a clear negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and poverty levels, there is also considerable heterogeneity around the 
average relationship. Figure 7 shows that a similar relationship holds after we take proportional 
differences: growth in GDP is strongly associated with poverty reduction, but there is 
considerable variation in the size of the effect. An illustration is provided by Ravallion (2001), 
who estimated a regression coefficient on a scatter-plot very much like that in Figure 7. The 95% 
confidence interval on that coefficient implies that a 2% rate of growth in mean income (which is 
about the average rate for developing countries in the 1980s and 90s) will bring anything from a 
1% to a 7% annual decline in poverty incidence.  
Why are there such large differences across countries (and time-periods) in the impact of 
growth on poverty? Given equation (1), it is unsurprising that the answer has to do with 
inequality. Interestingly, though, it has to do both with the initial level of inequality (i.e. how 
unequal a country is before a given growth spell) and with changes in that level (i.e. on the 
“incidence” of economic growth). Taking the differential of (1) will yields two terms,29 one of 
which accounts for the impact of changes in the mean (i.e. growth) holding the initial distribution 
constant while the other captures the change in the distribution (i.e. the Lorenz curve), holding 
the mean constant: 
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28 This second stylized fact was noted by Ravallion (1995), Ravallion and Chen (1997), Fields (2001), Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) amongst others. 
29 This is true if we hold the poverty line constant in real terms. If that is allowed to change over time (giving a 
relative poverty measure), there will be a third term for the change in the poverty line. 
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The first term is the growth component of poverty reduction, while the second term is the 
distributional component (the weighted sum of all changes in the distributional parameters).30 
Given the convexity of the Lorenz curve, equation (2) shows that the partial growth elasticity of 
poverty reduction ( μ
μ
∂
∂
H
H ) is always negative. This result conforms to intuition: holding the 
poverty line and the Lorenz curve constant, poverty must fall when the mean rises. But the sign 
of the second term is ambiguous, since it depends on the marginal change in the Lorenz curve—
in other words, it depends on the incidence of economic growth: on how the new income from 
growth is distributed.  
The two ways in which inequality affects the impact of growth on poverty can be seen 
clearly in (2). First, initial inequality reduces the growth component of poverty reduction (in 
absolute value), because 1−pL  tends to be higher in more unequal distributions. This stands to 
reason: the growth component captures how a given amount of growth would affect poverty if 
there was no change in the Lorenz curve. In other words: how it would affect poverty if the gains 
from growth were distributed proportionately to existing household incomes. Clearly, the more 
unequal the original distribution, the smaller the share of the growth accruing to the poor, and the 
lower the poverty reduction arising from that given growth; this was first demonstrated 
empirically by Ravallion (1997).31   
Figure 8, which is also taken from Ravallion (2007), plots the total growth elasticity of 
poverty reduction against initial inequality, for a sample of countries during 1981-2005, when 
poverty is defined by the $1-a-day line.32  It can be seen that the average empirical (total) 
elasticity is higher (in absolute values) the lower the initial inequality. The correlation coefficient 
of 0.26 is statistically significant at the 1% level. Whereas the elasticity averaged -4 for countries 
with Gini indices in the mid 20s, it was very close to zero for countries with a Gini index of 
about 0.60.  To illustrate the important role played by initial inequality, Ravallion (2007) uses a 
parsimonious parametric model, based on essentially the same data, to simulate the rate of 
poverty reduction with a 2% rate of growth and a headcount index of 40%. In a low-inequality 
country—a Gini index of 0.30 (say)—the headcount index will be halved in 11 years.  In a high-
                                                 
30 For further discussion of this decomposition see Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Kakwani (1993). 
31 For an up-date see Ravallion (2007). 
32 Period elasticities are smoothed by taking the simple average over two contiguous spells, and fifteen extreme 
elasticities (lower than -20 or above +20) are excluded. 
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inequality country—a Gini index of 0.60 (say)—it will take about 35 years to halve the initial 
poverty rate.33 
A second mechanism though which inequality affects the impact of growth on poverty is 
through changes in inequality during the growth process. If the aggregate changes in the Lorenz 
curve in the second term of the RHS of (2) are poverty increasing then the effect of growth on 
poverty will be less than the partial effect, holding distribution constant. Figure 8 also suggests 
that changes in initial inequality have considerable empirical importance, since this (and 
measurement error) accounts for the spread around the regression line.     
We can summarize these observations as: 
Stylized Fact 3: The higher the initial level of inequality in a country or the greater the 
increase in inequality during the growth spell, the higher the rate of growth that is 
needed to achieve any given (proportionate) rate of poverty reduction.  
We can thus sum up the analysis of the empirical inter-relationships between growth, 
poverty and inequality as follows. Despite some evidence that this might have begun to change 
in the 1990s, the balance of the evidence for the last quarter century suggests that there is no 
systematic empirical relationship between economic growth rates and changes in inequality 
(Stylized Fact 1).  Given the relationship that must hold between poverty, inequality and mean 
income in levels, Stylized Fact 1 implies that there must be a negative correlation between 
changes in poverty incidence and economic growth. This is indeed the case empirically: growth 
is good for the poor (Stylized Fact 2). But the relationship between mean income and poverty is 
mediated by the Lorenz curve, so that the power of growth to reduce poverty depends on 
inequality. In fact, that power tends to decline both with the initial level of inequality, and with 
increases in inequality during the growth process (Stylized Fact 3). 
 
4. Exploring the economics behind these stylized facts  
 How can we go beyond the mathematical relationship between mean income, poverty and 
inequality to gain a deeper understanding the economic forces behind changes in inequality and 
poverty, and their relationship with aggregate growth? In this section, we review some of the 
insights from three branches of the literature that has tried to explore these determinants.  
                                                 
33 The opposite also holds: high inequality protects the poor from the adverse impact of aggregate economic 
contraction. For example, high inequality districts of Indonesia experienced less dramatic rates of increase in 
poverty during the 1998 financial crisis than did low inequality districts (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2007). 
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 The first branch seeks to exploit spatial variation in the geographic and sectoral patterns 
of growth and in initial demographic and distributional conditions within countries to shed light 
on what makes growth more or less “pro-poor,” i.e. to examine its incidence within a country. 
Datt and Ravallion (1998) and Ravallion and Datt (2002) for India, Ravallion and Chen (2006) 
and Montalvo and Ravallion (2008) for China, Ravallion and Lokshin (2007) for Indonesia, and 
Ferreira, Leite and Ravallion (2007) for Brazil all follow this approach. In essence, these studies 
compute a panel of poverty rates across states (or provinces) and over time, and regress the 
changes against sector-specific rates of growth in each spatial unit. Control variables typically 
include differences in initial conditions across state, including pre-sample differences in land or 
income inequality, literacy, and the like. There may also be time-varying state-level controls, 
such as changes in various types of public spending in each state.  
 These studies require relatively long series of repeated cross-section household surveys, 
and are easiest to conduct in large countries, where spatially disaggregated sub-samples retain 
statistical representativeness. Looking across the studies carried out so far, a few lessons emerge. 
First, the sectoral composition of growth does seem to matter for poverty reduction. In all three 
countries, the growth elasticities of poverty reduction varied substantially and significantly 
across sectors. But the relative sector ranking varied across countries: agricultural growth was by 
far the most effective in reducing poverty in China, while growth in the services sector had a 
higher impact on poverty in Brazil and India. In all three countries, the effect of manufacturing 
growth on poverty reduction seemed to vary significantly across states, suggesting that diverse 
geographic, distributional or institutional conditions can affect the growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction, even within a single country.  
It was generally found that less “initial” (i.e. pre-sample) inequality was associated with a 
greater effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty (as the previous section would suggest). 
Greater literacy and better initial health conditions (often measured inversely by infant mortality 
rates) also help make growth more poverty-reducing. In India, about half of the range in long-
term rates of poverty reduction across India’s states (between the best performer, Kerala, and the 
worst one, Bihar) can be attributed to the difference in initial literacy rates (Datt and Ravallion, 
1998).  The elasticity of poverty to non-farm economic growth in India was particularly sensitive 
to differences in human resource development (Ravallion and Datt, 2002).  In Brazil, one 
interesting finding was that a greater level of voice or “empowerment”—proxied by the rate of 
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unionization more than ten years before the sample started—also raised the elasticity of poverty 
reduction with respect to growth (in manufacturing). 
 Other policies can also affect the pattern of distributional change (and thus of poverty 
reduction), even after one controls for differences in the pattern of growth.  A repeated finding is 
that higher rates of inflation result in lower rates of poverty reduction (in Brazil, China and 
India). The Brazilian case study revealed two important changes in the policy environment which 
contributed to greater success against poverty: a dramatic reduction in the country’s previously 
massive rate of inflation (in 1994), and a substantial increase in the amount of social security and 
social assistance payments, accompanied by some improvements in targeting, during the period 
1988-2004.  
 A second branch of literature is even more micro-oriented, and takes the individual 
household, rather than a state or province, as the unit of observation. This approach is 
exemplified by the various chapters in Bourguignon et al. (2005) and can be thought of as a set 
of statistical decompositions of the growth incidence curve, as given by )(ln)( pydpg =  (where 
it will be recalled that y(p) is the quantile function).34  g(p) is the income growth rate at 
percentile p of the distribution (for example, g(0.5) is the growth rate of the median income). In 
these studies, a small set of models for key economic relationships—such as earnings 
regressions, participation equations, or education demand functions—is estimated for both the 
initial and terminal years of the period under study. Then various counterfactual income 
distributions can be simulated by importing sets of parameters from either date into the 
corresponding models for the other date. The spirit of the exercise follows that of Oaxaca (1973) 
and Blinder (1973) and the results, like the original Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, are best 
interpreted as a statistical decomposition of changes in the distribution, rather than as measures 
of causal effects.  
                                                 
34 On the properties of the growth incidence curve see Ravallion and Chen (2003). When making distributional 
comparisons over time, the growth incidence curve can be calculated from any two cross-sectional surveys (which 
do not need to be panel surveys, given the usual anonymity assumption).  Alternatively, one of the two quantile 
functions can be a counterfactual distribution. It can also be shown that the changes in most commonly used poverty 
and inequality measures can also be written as functionals of the corresponding growth incidence curve, usually with 
weights that can be interpreted as the sensitivity of the particular measure to changes in the distribution at each 
percentile. This is particularly simple for the Watts index of poverty; it can be readily shown that the change in this 
index is given by the area under the growth incidence curve up to the headcount index of poverty (Ravallion and 
Chen, 2003). 
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Nevertheless, some of the empirical regularities arising from the studies of Latin America 
and East Asia in Bourguignon et al. (2005) are quite interesting. First, the increase in the returns 
to schooling that accompanied rapid growth in countries like Taiwan (China) or Indonesia tended 
to contribute to increases in inequality. This effect was also present in countries that grew less 
rapidly, like Mexico, and is reminiscent of the so-called “Tinbergen Race” between increases in 
the demand for schooling (arising from technological progress) and the rising supply of skilled 
workers (brought about by expansions in the educational system). In most countries in the 
sample, the demand-side dominated, leading to increased earnings inequality; the only 
exceptions were Brazil and Colombia.  
 Greater earnings inequality often led to higher inequality in household incomes, but not 
always. An interesting example is provided by Taiwan, where a marked increase in labor force 
participation by women led to a divergence between the earnings and income distributions. 
While the entry of relatively skilled women into the labor force reduced earnings inequality (as 
they entered roughly in the middle of the distribution), it contributed to an increase in the 
dispersion of household incomes: most of these new workers were married to skilled men, and 
lived in households that were already relatively well-off. The importance of changes in labor 
force participation and occupational structure is not an isolated characteristic of the Taiwanese 
experience. In Brazil, too, between 1976 and 1996, a substantial increase in extreme poverty was 
associated primarily with an increase in unemployment, informality, and underemployment. In 
Indonesia, a large share of the overall increase in inequality was associated with large 
movements of labor away from wage employment (in agriculture) towards (predominantly 
urban) self-employment. 
This approach also illustrates the ambiguous effect of rising levels of education on 
inequality. In Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico, substantial increases in the average level of 
schooling of the population did not lead to lower inequality. On the contrary, when one controls 
for the changes in returns, it seemed to be associated with higher inequality levels. This result 
was due to two effects: increases in the education stock that raised inequality in educational 
attainment itself (i.e. where most of the increase is accounted for by rises among the better-
educated), but also the fact that when returns to education are convex, even a distribution-neutral 
increase in schooling can lead to higher earnings inequality. Of course, educational expansions 
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can offset this effect if they lower returns to schooling, but this is less likely to happen in 
countries experiencing sharp increases in demand for skills.  
By its very nature, this generalized Blinder-Oaxaca approach is, in isolation, incapable of 
attributing the causal origin of any of these changes to specific exogenous or policy shocks. This 
is particularly true when broad policy changes, such as a large-scale liberalization of trade, or a 
permanent change in the exchange rate, are expected to have substantial general equilibrium 
effects, affecting many variables at the same time. Wide-ranging changes in tariffs, for instance, 
can affect the distribution of income or consumption through changes in consumer prices, 
changes in relative wage rates, and changes in employment levels across industries. All of these 
variables will be changing in the micro-simulations that generate counterfactual growth 
incidence curves, but which share of the changes is due to the trade liberalization policy is 
anyone’s guess.  
To address this point, a third branch of the literature has sought to combine 
macroeconomic or general equilibrium models with micro-simulations on household survey data. 
Examples include Bourguignon, Robinson and Robilliard (2002) for the Indonesian crisis, Chen 
and Ravallion (2004b) for China’s accession to the WTO, and Ferreira et al. (2003) for Brazil’s 
devaluation in 1998-9. These models are still in their early, experimental phase, and are subject 
to the usual criticisms leveled against computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). 
Nevertheless, when the model is run on a single household survey, and its predictions are 
checked against a separate, ex-post survey (as in the case of Brazil), its distributional prediction 
performance is superior to those of the previous generation of representative-agent CGEs.35   
A common finding in these exercises concerns the importance of worker and employment 
flows across sectors, in response to shocks or policy changes that affect relative prices. 
Developing country labor markets are often de facto very flexible (despite sometimes significant 
de jure rigidities), because of the existence of large informal sectors. When relative goods prices 
change in response to a change in the exchange rate (as in Brazil, in 1998) or policy change (as 
in China’s accession to the WTO), different industries contract and expand in response, and 
workers to move across these sectors.  
                                                 
35 An intermediate approach seeks to identify the causal effects of policy changes econometrically, and then estimate 
their share within the different components of a micro-simulation-based decomposition. Ferreira, Leite and Wai-Poi. 
(2007) regress changes in wages and employment levels disaggregated by sectors on (arguably exogenous) changes 
in tariffs and exchange rates. These trade-mandated changes are then used to generate counterfactual growth 
incidence curves, which can be interpreted alongside other micro-simulation results.   
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5. Conclusions 
Absolute poverty is clearly a bigger problem in developing countries—where over four-
fifths of the world’s population lives—than in developed ones. Virtually all of the one billion 
people subsisting on per capita incomes less than one dollar per day live in developing countries. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, inequality is also a bigger problem in developing countries. Looking 
at the world as a whole, there is a clear negative correlation between average levels of inequality 
and the level of development, and all countries with really high income inequality—a Gini index 
of (say) 0.50 or higher—are developing economies. 
However, the evidence from the available cross-section of developing countries suggests 
that there is little aggregate tendency for these inequality levels to fall with economic growth. 
Although there are no developed countries today with inequality levels above a Gini index of 
0.50, growth rates among developing countries are virtually uncorrelated with changes in 
inequality levels. This is our first stylized fact.  
The absence of a robust cross-country correlation between changes in inequality and 
growth necessarily implies that there must be a strong negative correlation between growth and 
changes in poverty. This is confirmed empirically: on average, economies that grow faster 
reduce absolute poverty much more rapidly—our second stylized fact. 
But this does not mean that policymakers in developing countries can ignore inequality. 
There are a number of reasons why persistently high inequality is a concern. Two primary 
reasons were not discussed here, namely the fact that higher inequality may be ethically 
objectionable in its own right, and the possibility that greater inequality may generate certain 
inefficiencies that could actually reduce the future rate of economic growth. World Bank (2005) 
contains summary discussions of both points; on the second also see Voitchovsky (2008). In this 
paper, we have focused on a third reason why persistent inequality may be undesirable in 
developing economies: the fact that, even for a given growth rate, inequality tends to reduce the 
growth elasticity of poverty reduction—our third stylized fact. Other things equal, one 
percentage point of growth leads to a smaller reduction in poverty in a very unequal country than 
in a less unequal one. And if inequality rises during the growth process, things are worse yet. 
While these three stylized facts can be identified from a macro, cross-country 
perspective, an understanding of the economic factors behind changes in distribution (or behind 
the levels and incidence of growth) in developing countries requires a more microeconomic 
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approach, which exploits differences in conditions within countries. Changes in income 
distribution respond to so many different stimuli—in a general equilibrium environment—that 
no single method has yet been developed to fully identify the causes of all observed changes. 
Instead, researchers have relied on a variety of different approaches. Sub-national regression 
analysis (using geographical panel data) sheds light on the relative importance of sectoral growth 
patterns, and of initial differences in the distribution of land or human capital. Micro-simulation 
based decompositions of growth incidence curves can help us understand the relative roles of 
changes in household endowments; changes in returns to those endowments; and changes in 
participation and occupational choices. Finally, combining such micro-simulations with models 
capable to capturing the general equilibrium transmission of initial shocks can help us 
understand the distributional impact of broad, economy-wide policy changes.  
As we move forward, more research is needed on all of these fronts, and in their 
integration. It is only from such research that we can hope to learn what enables some countries 
(such as Vietnam) to grow rapidly with little or no rise in inequality, and thus to enjoy dramatic 
rates of poverty reduction. The diversity of country experience has established that equitable 
growth is possible, and that it is particularly pro-poor. But much remains to be learned about 
both the general economic conditions and the policy context within which it is achievable. 
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Figure 2: Income levels and poverty around the world
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    Figure 3: Trends in the incidence of absolute poverty in LDCs, by region. 
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Figure 4: Global Inequality and its components, 1820-1992. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1820 1850 1870 1890 1910 1929 1950 1960 1970 1980 1992
Year
M
ea
n 
lo
g 
de
vi
at
io
n
Within-Country Inequality Between-Country Inequality Global Inequality
0.42
0.83
0.69
0.37
0.36
0.33
0.05
0.33
0.50
 
Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) and World Bank (2005).
 33
          Figure 5: Intercountry inequality and international inequality, 1950-2000. 
 
Source: Milanovic (2005) and World Bank (2005). 
 
Figure 6: Absolute and relative inequality in the world, 1970-2000 
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Figure 7: Growth in poverty headcount against growth in survey mean consumption or 
income in LDCS, 1981-2004 
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Figure 8: Empirical growth elasticities of poverty reduction against initial Gini index: 
LDCs in 1981-2004. 
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Table 1: Poverty and inequality measures for individual countries, 1990s and 2000s. 
    International Poverty Line Inequality   
# Country 
World Bank's 
regional 
classification N 
GDP per capita, 
PPP (constant 
2000 
international 
$)** 
Survey 
Year y/c 
Population 
Below $1 a 
day % 
Population 
Below $2 a 
day % 
Gini 
Index MLD Source * 
1 Albania ECA 4,955.27 1997 0.10 11.30 0.291 0.141 
        2004 
c 
0.30 9.30 0.311 0.163 
1 
2 Algeria MNA 6,375.64 1995 1.10 14.40 0.353 0.215 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
3 Argentina LAC 13,652.41 1996 1.10 9.80 0.486 0.429 
        2003 
y 
6.60 17.40 0.513 0.510 
1 
4 Armenia ECA 5,011.03 1996 6.80 31.80 0.444 0.343 
        2003 
c 
1.70 30.30 0.338 0.198 
1 
5 Australia HI 30,677.86 1994 .. .. 0.320 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
6 Austria HI 30,735.78 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.290 .. 
3 
7 Azerbaijan ECA 5,953.36 1995 11.50 45.80 0.350 0.211 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
8 Bangladesh SAR 1,916.20 1996 32.90 81.90 0.330 0.185 
        .. 
c 
      .. 
1 
9 Belarus ECA 7,809.61 1995 1.40 13.00 0.288 0.143 
        2002 
c 
0.00 1.40 0.297 0.147 
1 
10 Belgium HI 30,004.20 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.260 .. 
2 
11 Bolivia LAC 2,579.16 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2002 
y 
24.00 42.90 0.602 0.709 
1 
12 Bosnia & Herzegovina ECA .. .. .. .. .. .. 
        2001 
c 
.. .. 0.250 .. 
2 
13 Botswana SSA 11,313.27 1994 28.50 56.10 0.610 0.673 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
14 Brazil LAC 7,825.78 1995 10.50 23.30 0.615 0.756 
        2004 
y 
7.60 19.80 0.570 0.617 
1 
15 Bulgaria ECA 8,753.89 1994 0.00 1.30 0.243 0.099 
        2003 
c 
0.00 6.40 0.292 0.146 
1 
16 Burkina Faso SSA 1,142.93 1994 51.40 80.10 0.507 0.441 
        2003 
c 
28.70 71.30 0.396 0.267 
1 
17 Burundi SSA 629.81 1992 44.10 85.10 0.333 0.183 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
18 Cambodia EAP 2,628.83 1994 82.00 96.20 0.383 0.252 
        2004 
c 
66.00 89.80 0.429 0.307 
1 
19 Cameroon SSA 2,079.40 1996 35.80 71.80 0.468 0.375 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
20 Canada HI 30,277.87 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.330 .. 
2 
21 Cape Verde SSA 5,381.04 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2001 
c 
1.90 19.00 0.510 0.446 
1 
22 Central African Rep. SSA 1,111.49 1993 66.60 84.00 0.613 0.741 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
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23 Chile LAC 10,938.57 1994 0.90 10.80 0.552 0.548 
        2003 
y 
0.50 5.60 0.549 0.539 
1 
24 China EAP 6,620.67 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2004 
c 
9.90 34.90 0.470 .. 
3 
25 Hong Kong, China HI 32,901.35 1996 .. .. 0.430 .. 
        .. 
  
.. .. .. .. 
3 
26 Colombia LAC 6,886.04 1995 3.10 16.30 0.572 0.611 
        2003 
y 
7.60 19.40 0.588 0.669 
1 
27 Costa Rica LAC 9,646.49 1996 3.60 13.30 0.471 0.419 
        2003 
y 
1.80 9.60 0.498 0.459 
1 
28 Côte d’Ivoire SSA 1,470.76 1995 12.30 49.40 0.367 0.227 
        2002 
c 
15.70 48.40 0.484 0.409 
1 
29 Croatia ECA 12,164.04 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2001 
c 
0.00 0.50 0.310 0.159 
1 
30 Czech Rep. HI 19,699.53 1993 0.00 0.00 0.266 0.121 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
31 Denmark HI 31,422.48 1997 .. .. 0.270 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
32 Dominican Republic LAC 7,617.82 1996 1.80 11.70 0.487 0.426 
        2004 
y 
2.80 16.20 0.516 0.476 
1 
33 Timor-Leste EAP .. .. .. .. .. .. 
        2001 
c 
.. .. 0.370 .. 
2 
34 Ecuador LAC 3,981.58 1994 16.80 37.40 0.520 0.511 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
35 Egypt, Arab Rep. MNA 4,031.03 1995 3.80 47.00 0.326 0.179 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
36 El Salvador LAC 4,775.52 1995 20.80 47.10 0.499 0.454 
        2002 
y 
20.40 40.50 0.523 0.541 
1 
37 Estonia HI 15,885.01 1995 0.40 6.90 0.301 0.155 
        2003 
c 
1.00 6.70 0.358 0.220 
1 
38 Ethiopia SSA 1,030.17 1995 31.30 76.40 0.400 0.278 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
39 Finland HI 30,420.32 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.300 .. 
2 
40 France HI 28,876.53 1995 .. .. 0.330 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
3 
41 Gambia, The SSA 1,744.87 1992 53.70 84.00 0.478 0.402 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
42 Georgia ECA 3,303.92 1996 0.00 8.50 0.371 0.240 
        2003 
c 
6.40 25.80 0.404 0.288 
1 
43 Germany HI 27,437.59 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.280 .. 
2 
44 Ghana SSA 2,299.10 1992 47.30 84.00 0.381 0.243 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
45 Greece HI 21,674.64 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.340 .. 
3 
46 Guatemala LAC 4,150.21 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2002 
y 
13.90 32.60 0.553 0.581 
1 
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47 Guinea SSA 2,107.90 1993 .. .. 0.400 .. 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
48 Guyana LAC 4,203.60 1993 8.10 27.00 0.516 0.499 
          
y 
      .. 
1 
49 Haiti LAC 1,479.34 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2001 
y 
52.90 77.60 0.600 0.675 
1 
50 Honduras LAC 3,170.33 1994 23.70 48.20 0.552 0.573 
        2003 
y 
14.10 36.00 0.539 0.523 
1 
51 Hungary ECA 16,927.87 1993 0.00 0.80 0.279 0.134 
        2002 
c 
0.00 0.70 0.268 0.119 
1 
52 India SAR 3,307.95 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2004 
c 
33.50 80.00 0.368 .. 
3 
53 Indonesia EAP 3,570.06 1993 17.40 64.20 0.344 0.193 
        2002 
c 
7.80 52.90 0.343 0.197 
1 
54 Iran, Islamic Rep. MNA 7,405.16 1994 0.40 7.00 0.430 0.322 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
55 Ireland HI 36,237.93 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.310 .. 
2 
56 Israel HI   .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.310 .. 
2 
57 Italy HI 26,495.73 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2001 
c 
.. .. 0.350 .. 
2 
58 Jamaica LAC 3,907.43 1993 4.90 27.50 0.357 0.221 
        2004 
c 
0.50 14.40 0.455 0.357 
1 
59 Japan HI 27,991.92 1993 .. .. 0.248 .. 
        2004 
c 
.. .. 0.450 .. 
3 
60 Jordan MNA 5,175.99 1992 0.60 10.60 0.434 0.323 
        2002 
c 
0.10 7.50 0.389 0.255 
1 
61 Kazakhstan ECA 7,652.20 1993 0.40 17.50 0.327 0.179 
        2003 
c 
0.90 17.10 0.339 0.194 
1 
62 Kenya SSA 1,137.37 1994 26.50 62.30 0.445 0.345 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
63 Kuwait HI   1998 .. .. 0.320 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
64 Kyrgyz Republic ECA 1,749.30 1993 8.00 17.30 0.537 0.586 
        2003 
c 
0.40 23.50 0.303 0.152 
1 
65 Lao PDR EAP 2,012.94 1992 18.60 74.90 0.304 0.158 
        2002 
c 
27.40 74.20 0.347 0.202 
1 
66 Latvia ECA 13,724.49 1995 0.00 7.00 0.310 0.167 
        2003 
c 
0.50 4.40 0.377 0.247 
1 
67 Lebanon MNA 4,876.22 1995 .. .. 0.630 .. 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
68 Leshoto SSA 3,104.77 1995 36.40 56.00 0.631 0.840 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
69 Lithuania ECA 14,020.39 1994 2.50 16.00 0.373 0.242 
        2003 
c 
0.60 7.50 0.360 0.224 
1 
70 Macedonia, FYR ECA 6,579.66  .. .. .. .. .. 
        2003 
c 
0.20 3.30 0.390 0.263 
1 
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71 Madagascar SSA 840.15 1993 46.30 80.00 0.461 0.373 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
72 Malawi SSA 631.45 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2004 
c 
20.80 63.00 0.390 0.258 
1 
73 Malaysia EAP 10,090.96 1995 0.90 13.50 0.485 0.416 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
74 Mali SSA 942.05 1994 72.30 90.60 0.505 0.437 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
75 Mauritania SSA 2,160.64 1993 49.40 81.90 0.501 0.436 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
76 Mexico LAC 9,967.30 1995 8.40 26.00 0.537 0.528 
        2004 
c 
1.90 12.50 0.461 0.379 
1 
77 Moldova ECA 2,151.04 1992 7.30 31.80 0.343 0.201 
        2003 
c 
1.10 20.80 0.351 0.207 
1 
78 Mongolia EAP 2,033.98 1995 13.30 48.90 0.332 0.188 
        2002 
c 
10.80 44.80 0.328 0.184 
1 
79 Morocco MNA 4,346.35 1998 0.60 14.30 0.390 0.264 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
80 Mozambique SSA 1,162.36 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2002 
c 
36.20 74.10 0.471 0.386 
1 
81 Namibia SSA 7,037.76 1993 34.90 55.80 0.743 1.132 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
82 Nepal SAR 1,379.11 1996 34.40 77.90 0.377 0.239 
        2003 
c 
24.70 64.80 0.473 0.382 
1 
83 Netherlands HI 31,305.98 .. .. .. .. .. 
        1999 
y 
.. .. 0.290 .. 
2 
84 New Zeland HI 23,109.26 1997 .. .. 0.370 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
85 Nicaragua LAC 3,538.94 1993 47.90 77.90 0.504 0.452 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
86 Niger SSA 1994 54.80 86.10 0.415 0.291 
      
700.29 
.. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
87 Nigeria SSA 1,008.09 1993 59.20 85.30 0.450 0.374 
        2003 
c 
71.20 92.30 0.436 0.331 
1 
88 Norway HI 37,667.33 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.270 .. 
2 
89 Pakistan SAR 2,206.29 1993 8.50 63.00 0.303 0.157 
        2004 
c 
9.00 59.50 0.312 0.165 
1 
90 Panama LAC 7,234.06 1995 7.40 17.40 0.571 0.645 
        2003 
y 
6.00 16.80 0.561 0.603 
1 
91 Papua New Guinea EAP 2,321.83 1996 .. .. 0.509 .. 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
3 
92 Paraguay LAC 4,368.11 1995 19.40 38.50 0.591 0.687 
        2003 
y 
13.60 29.80 0.584 0.660 
1 
93 Peru LAC 5,725.07 1994 9.40 31.60 0.449 0.350 
        2003 
y 
10.50 30.60 0.520 0.489 
1 
94 Philippines EAP 4,730.58 1994 18.10 52.70 0.429 0.306 
        2003 
c 
13.50 43.90 0.445 0.332 
1 
95 Poland ECA 13,349.33 1993 4.10 11.80 0.324 0.208 
        2002 
c 
0.10 1.50 0.341 0.197 
1 
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96 Portugal HI 18,965.97 1994-97 <2 <2 0.390 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
97 Romania ECA 8,721.79 1994 2.80 27.40 0.282 0.136 
        2003 
c 
1.10 12.60 0.311 0.169 
1 
98 Russian Federation ECA 10,349.98 1993 6.10 22.70 0.483 0.420 
        2002 
c 
0.70 13.50 0.399 0.273 
1 
99 Rwanda SSA 1,104.69 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
c 
60.30 87.80 0.470 0.378 
1 
100 Senegal SSA 1,598.65 1995 24.00 65.70 0.414 0.296 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
101 Serbia & Montenegro ECA .. .. .. .. .. .. 
        2003 
c 
.. .. 0.280 .. 
2 
102 Sierra Leone SSA 752.51 1989 57.00 74.20 0.630 0.732 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
103 Singapore HI 28,305.42 1998 .. .. 0.430 .. 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
104 Slovak Rep. ECA 15,408.87 1992 0.00 0.00 0.195 0.066 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
105 Slovenia HI 20,890.20 1993 0.00 0.00 0.292 .. 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
2 
106 South Africa SSA 10,337.77 1995 6.30 32.20 0.566 0.564 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
107 Spain HI 24,680.95 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.350 .. 
2 
108 Sri Lanka SAR 4,391.40 1996 6.60 45.40 0.344 0.199 
        2002 
c 
5.80 41.50 0.402 0.271 
1 
109 St. Lucia LAC 6,482.11 1995 25.20 59.60 0.426 0.316 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
110 Swaziland SSA 4,440.13 1995 68.20 87.40 0.607 0.688 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
111 Sweden HI 30,392.45 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.250 .. 
2 
112 Switzerland HI 32,775.22 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.340 .. 
3 
113 Tajikistan ECA 1,256.90 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2003 
c 
7.00 42.50 0.326 0.179 
1 
114 Tanzania SSA 649.53 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
c 
57.00 90.20 0.350 .. 
1 
115 Thailand EAP 8,065.13 1992 6.00 37.50 0.462 0.357 
        2002 
c 
0.90 25.80 0.420 0.297 
1 
116 Trinidad & Tobago HI 14,708.07 1992 5.10 23.20 0.403 0.288 
        .. 
y 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
117 Tunisia MNA 7,758.15 1995 1.00 12.70 0.417 0.301 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
118 Turkey ECA 7,842.15 1994 2.40 18.00 0.415 0.299 
        2003 
c 
3.20 19.40 0.437 0.335 
1 
119 Turkmenistan ECA .. 1993 20.70 59.10 0.354 0.209 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
 40
 
120 Uganda SSA 1,312.82 1992 90.30 98.10 0.426 0.319 
        2002 
c 
82.30 95.70 0.458 0.364 
1 
121 Ukraine ECA 6,605.20 1995 2.10 14.80 0.393 0.267 
        2003 
c 
0.20 5.00 0.281 0.133 
1 
122 United Kingdom HI 30,237.16 .. .. .. .. .. 
        1999 
y 
.. .. 0.340 .. 
2 
123 United States HI 38,165.25 .. .. .. .. .. 
        2000 
y 
.. .. 0.380 .. 
2 
124 Uruguay LAC 9,897.78 1996 0.60 4.60 0.438 0.344 
        2004 
y 
0.00 9.20 0.461 0.378 
1 
125 Uzbekistan ECA 1,942.35 1993 3.30 26.50 0.333 0.189 
        2003 
c 
0.00 1.80 0.367 0.230 
1 
126 Venezuela, RB de LAC 6,485.33 1995 9.40 28.80 0.468 0.402 
        2003 
y 
18.70 40.20 0.482 0.461 
1 
127 Vietnam EAP 2,924.84 1993 14.60 58.20 0.357 0.214 
        2004 
c 
0.60 21.90 0.371 0.229 
1 
128 Yemen, Rep. MNA 857.68 1992 3.40 19.90 0.395 0.268 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
129 Zambia SSA 949.10 1993 73.60 90.70 0.526 0.518 
        2004 
c 
60.00 84.90 0.507 0.467 
1 
130 Zimbabwe SSA 1,738.57 1995 56.10 83.00 0.501 0.433 
        .. 
c 
.. .. .. .. 
1 
Notes: N The World Bank classifies countries regionally and among income groups according to 2006 nominal GNI per capita, calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas method. High income countries have GNI per capita of $11,116 or more. ECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia; 
MNA=Middle-East and North Africa; EAP=East Asia and the Pacific; SAR=South Asia; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa; LAC=Latin America and 
Caribbean; HI=High Income.  y=income; c=consumption;   
*     1=PovCal; 2=WDR 06; 3=WDI;  
**   Source: the World Bank Indicators, reference year 2006. 
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Table 2:  Poverty measures for $1 a day 
(a) Percentage of population  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 
East-Asia and Pacific (EAP) 57.73 39.02 28.23 29.84 25.23 16.14 15.46 12.33 9.05 
   Of which China 63.76 41.02 28.64 32.98 28.36 17.37 17.77 13.79 9.90 
Eastern-Europe+Central Asia (ECA) 0.70 0.51 0.35 0.46 3.60 4.42 3.78 1.27 0.94 
Latin America+Caribbean (LAC) 10.77 13.07 12.09 10.19 8.42 8.87 9.66 9.09 8.64 
Middle East+North Africa (MNA) 5.08 3.82 3.09 2.33 1.87 1.69 2.08 1.69 1.47 
South Asia (SAS) 49.57 45.43 45.11 43.04 36.87 36.06 34.92 33.56 30.84 
   Of which India 51.75 47.94 46.15 44.31 41.82 39.94 37.66 36.03 34.33 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 42.26 46.20 47.22 46.73 45.47 47.72 45.77 42.63 41.10 
Total 40.14 32.72 28.72 28.66 25.56 22.66 22.10 20.13 18.09 
Total excl.China 31.35 29.69 28.75 27.14 24.58 24.45 23.54 22.19 20.70 
(b) Number of people  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 
EAP 796.40 564.30 428.76 476.22 420.22 279.09 276.54 226.77 169.13 
China 633.66 425.27 310.43 374.33 334.21 211.44 222.78 176.61 128.36 
ECA 3.00 2.27 1.61 2.16 16.94 20.87 17.90 6.01 4.42 
LAC 39.35 50.90 50.00 44.60 38.83 42.96 49.03 48.13 47.02 
MNA 8.81 7.26 6.41 5.26 4.53 4.38 5.67 4.88 4.40 
SAS 455.18 445.05 471.14 479.10 436.74 452.91 463.40 469.55 446.20 
India 363.72 359.41 368.60 376.44 376.14 378.91 376.25 377.84 370.67 
SSA 167.53 199.78 222.80 240.34 252.26 286.21 296.07 296.11 298.30 
Total 1470.28 1269.56 1180.73 1247.68 1170.17 1087.81 1108.61 1051.46 969.48 
Total excl.China 836.62 844.29 870.30 873.35 835.96 876.37 885.83 874.85 841.12 
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2007). The set of countries are the Part 2 member countries of the World Bank, which is essentially all low and 
middle-income countries, which the Bank currently defines as having average GDP per capita over 2004-06 no more than $11,115. 
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Table 3:  Poverty measures for $2 a day 
(a) Percentage of population  
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004
EAP 84.80 77.17 68.53 69.73 65.04 52.49 49.34 41.68 36.58
China 88.12 79.00 68.64 72.16 68.13 53.34 50.05 40.94 34.89
ECA 4.60 3.93 3.08 4.31 16.53 17.97 18.57 12.88 9.79
LAC 28.45 32.25 29.57 26.25 24.09 25.24 25.31 24.76 22.17
MNA 29.16 25.59 24.24 21.69 21.41 21.40 23.62 21.09 19.70
SAS 88.53 87.01 86.57 85.62 82.22 82.12 80.41 79.73 77.12
India 88.92 87.89 86.98 86.30 85.33 84.12 82.67 81.37 80.36
SSA 74.52 76.98 77.36 77.05 76.09 76.42 75.85 73.81 71.97
Total 66.96 64.25 60.73 60.79 59.44 55.52 54.24 50.69 47.55
Total excl.China 59.08 58.87 57.89 56.78 56.43 56.26 55.63 53.85 51.58
 (b) Number of people (millions) 
Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004
EAP 1169.74 1115.97 1040.71 1112.93 1083.21 907.83 882.70 766.26 683.83
China 875.77 819.11 744.07 819.11 802.86 649.47 627.55 524.24 452.25
ECA 19.78 17.38 14.03 20.07 77.83 84.88 87.94 60.75 46.25
LAC 103.90 125.58 122.30 114.85 111.08 122.30 128.44 131.14 120.62
MNA 50.56 48.62 50.24 48.91 51.80 55.40 64.50 60.92 59.13
SAS 813.04 852.39 904.21 953.00 973.99 1031.48 1067.15 1115.54 1115.77
India 624.92 658.92 694.71 733.13 767.39 798.07 825.93 853.32 867.62
SSA 295.46 332.87 365.02 396.32 422.11 458.37 490.58 512.62 522.34
Total 2452.47 2492.81 2496.50 2646.09 2721.72 2665.66 2721.31 2647.22 2547.94
Total excl. China 1576.70 1673.70 1752.42 1826.98 1918.86 2016.19 2093.75 2122.98 2095.69
Note: For region identifiers see Table 2. Source: Chen and Ravallion (2007). 
 
 
